KEYWORDS: Data modeling, Data analysis, Statistical analysis, Analytical research, New and emerging technologies, Failure analysis, Social sciences, Lutetium, Databases
The rise of new technology is reshaping corporate governance regimes and firm financial behavior. Investment activities are the main driving force for the rapid development of the nation and the basis for the company's success in today's competitive market. This paper adopts Richardson's expected investment model and the pooled regression model, based on the data A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020, with executive incentives as the main entry point, to empirically study the impact of the internal compensation gap of executives on investment in China. The results show that the internal compensation gap of the senior management team is negatively related to investment efficiency. The larger the internal compensation gap, the higher level of inefficient investment; In state-owned companies, the negative effect of the executive internal compensation gap on investment efficiency is more significant, and inefficient investment is reflected as over-investment. This paper provides targeted practical advice for different companies on how to improve investment efficiency through the system design of executive compensation.
Access to the requested content is limited to institutions that have purchased or subscribe to SPIE eBooks.
You are receiving this notice because your organization may not have SPIE eBooks access.*
*Shibboleth/Open Athens users─please
sign in
to access your institution's subscriptions.
To obtain this item, you may purchase the complete book in print or electronic format on
SPIE.org.
INSTITUTIONAL Select your institution to access the SPIE Digital Library.
PERSONAL Sign in with your SPIE account to access your personal subscriptions or to use specific features such as save to my library, sign up for alerts, save searches, etc.