Semantic security of public key encryption schemes is often
interchangeable with the art of building trapdoors. In the frame
of reference of Random Oracle methodology, the "Key Privacy" and
"Anonymity" has often been discussed. However to a certain degree
the security of most public key encryption schemes is required to
be analyzed with formal proofs using one-way functions. This paper
evaluates the design of El Gamal and RSA based schemes and
attempts to parallelize the trapdoor primitives used in the
computation of the cipher text, thereby magnifying the decryption
error δp in the above schemes.
Access to the requested content is limited to institutions that have purchased or subscribe to SPIE eBooks.
You are receiving this notice because your organization may not have SPIE eBooks access.*
*Shibboleth/Open Athens users─please
sign in
to access your institution's subscriptions.
To obtain this item, you may purchase the complete book in print or electronic format on
SPIE.org.
INSTITUTIONAL Select your institution to access the SPIE Digital Library.
PERSONAL Sign in with your SPIE account to access your personal subscriptions or to use specific features such as save to my library, sign up for alerts, save searches, etc.