This paper analyzes the possibility of an attack on an ultrahigh frequency radio frequency identification (UHF RFID) access system and presents some practical results for the systems that are in the ISO 18000-6 standard: we analyze the security breach of an RFID based system, namely the attacks concentrated on the access barriers that have already been installed within an institution. The testing was conducted in normal conditions where no interference was present, then a jammer was introduced transmitting with different transmission power values. It will be identified the situation where the system becomes completely unfunctional, the communication between the RFID reader and the tag is interrupted, the reading of the access code being impossible to perform. This underscores once again the physical radio frequency vulnerability of RFID communication systems, in this case UHF RFID systems.
Within this paper the authors intend to measure and evaluate the parameters of a WiMax BTS when different interference conditions are existing within its operating area. The measurements were performed in laboratory conditions, in the semianechoic chamber. The effect of variable intensity disturbance interference on the emission parameters of a WiMax base station were measured and analyzed. As a result of these measurements, several situations were analyzed and a number of interesting conclusions were drawn. These measurements have been developed in order to evaluate the effect of a of disruptive interference on the quality of the transmitted signal, as well as the importance of detecting, measuring and analyzing the interference effect on the transmitted signal in different use-case scenarios. The narrowband disturbance signal, with variable intensity, was generated on the 3.623 GHz frequency with the SME 03 Rohde and Schwarz signal generator. Parameter measurements and spectral evaluations were performed with the Anritsu Master Spectrum 2723C spectrum analyzer, tuned to the frequency 3.623 GHz, using transmission and reception antennas in the respective band. An Airspan MacroMAXe-4RX base station, 3600-3700 MHz frequency band, with 5 MHz bandwidth, was used to perform the tests.
KEYWORDS: Global system for mobile communications, Standards development, Networks, Cell phones, Network security, Receivers, Algorithm development, Mobile communications, Telecommunications
The rapid development of the telecommunication standards, which are getting close to the implementation of the 5th generation now (5G) leads to us to neglect the GSM standard, where there are still vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate step by step the authentication in GSM, of mobile subscribers, technical parameters and vulnerabilities identified in this process, with practical measurements. In Romania, GSM is used by the Operators as a backup network, or to cover with signal long areas (in the mountains) where there is no specific (high data rate transfer) demands from the users. Based on the results obtained a number of interesting conclusions are drawn.
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