The electric power system is evolving into an electric cyber-physical system (ECPS) that is highly integrated with cyberspace, realizing real-time interaction and deep integration of information flow and energy flow. The obvious security risk of ECPS is that the security risks in cyberspace and physical space will superimpose each other and form a chain failure across space. In the current security technology of ECPS, the detection methods for information threats and power system faults lack internal correlation and are isolated from each other, so it is impossible to show the overall security status of ECPS from a macro level. This paper proposes a threat situation assessment framework for ECPS, and conducts a macro analysis of the overall security status of ECPS, filling in the current lack of technical gaps in the detection of cross-space cascading faults caused by information threats.
KEYWORDS: Data storage, Computer security, Sensor networks, Network security, Data transmission, Sensors, Data modeling, Data processing, Design and modelling, Data communications
Traditional wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to data interception and tampering due to their low security. In order to meet the data security requirements under the current data explosion network environment, based on the traditional wireless sensor network, an intermediate node storage node is added between the sensing node and the base station to form a two-layer wireless sensor network, which makes the data management more secure, and makes the network expansion, deletion, and maintenance more convenient. At the same time, in the process of data encryption, lightweight national encryption algorithms SM2 and SM3 are used to improve the speed of data encryption while reducing the hardware demand for data. Therefore, a network model of "two-layer wireless sensor network data encryption based on national security algorithm" is proposed.
With the advancement of digital transformation, digital relay protection devices have replaced traditional protection devices and become an important part of the stable operation of the power system. The IEC 61850 standard is the basic protocol for real-time communication and data exchange between key substation equipment and is widely used in substation automation equipment and protection devices. However, IEC 61850 has a man-in-the-middle attack security risk. This paper studies the network attack of IEC 61850 Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol. By exploiting protocol loopholes to achieve penetration attacks, forged GOOSE data frames are injected into the interval layer of the substation communication network, and sent to multiple relay protection devices at the same time to carry out coordinated network attacks, which can cause multiple relay protection devices to incorrectly issue trip commands , resulting in cascading failures in the grid, which eventually lead to power outages. Finally, simulation experiments are carried out through hardware loop simulation and real-time digital simulator (RTDS) to verify the effectiveness of the attack simulation.
Access to the requested content is limited to institutions that have purchased or subscribe to SPIE eBooks.
You are receiving this notice because your organization may not have SPIE eBooks access.*
*Shibboleth/Open Athens users─please
sign in
to access your institution's subscriptions.
To obtain this item, you may purchase the complete book in print or electronic format on
SPIE.org.
INSTITUTIONAL Select your institution to access the SPIE Digital Library.
PERSONAL Sign in with your SPIE account to access your personal subscriptions or to use specific features such as save to my library, sign up for alerts, save searches, etc.