Photonic graph states serve as promising resources in various measurement-based quantum computation and communication protocols, such as quantum repeaters. However, their realization with linear optics poses challenges due to the absence of deterministic photon-entangling gates in such platforms. A potential solution involves leveraging quantum emitters, such as quantum dots or NV centers, to establish entanglement and subsequently transfer it to the emitted photons. The design of a quantum circuit that implements the generation of a graph state within such a framework is highly non-trivial nonetheless. Here, we introduce a generation circuit optimization approach that leverages the concept of local equivalency of graphs and employs graph theoretical correlations to explore alternative, cost-effective circuits. Obtaining a 50% reduction in the use of 2-qubit gates for preparing repeater graph states highlights the potential efficacy of our method.
The current paradigm for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the legitimate users of the system trusting their devices, which include both the quantum communication components and the classical post-processing units. However, in view of the memory attacks recently proposed against device-independent QKD, as well as the many hardware and software Trojan Horse attacks that threaten the security of conventional cryptography today, such trust is a very strong and unjustified assumption. Here we review a recent proposal to solve this problem based on the use of verifiable secret sharing and redundancies. We show that this approach can deliver secret key rates which are comparable to those obtained in an ideal scenario with honest devices.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) needs to close the big gap between theory and practice to be a suitable technology for achieving information-theoretic secure communications. Indeed, recent studies on side-channel attacks have exposed the vulnerabilities of QKD implementations against an eavesdropper who may try to attack both the source and the measurement device. Here, we review two potential approaches that, combined, could bring this goal closer: measurement-device-independent QKD and the loss-tolerant QKD protocol. The former removes all possible side-channels from the measurement apparatus and guarantees a high performance over long distances. The latter appears as a robust solution against typical source flaws and it offers similar key rates as those of standard QKD systems. Most importantly, the feasibility of both solutions has already been demonstrated in several lab and field-test experiments.
In most implementations of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols the secure keys originate from single-photon signals. However, due to the unavoidable channel losses and the low efficiencies of single photon detectors, the key generation rate of a single-photon QKD system is low. Recently, there has been a growing interest in the Gaussianmodulated coherent state (GMCS) QKD protocol because it can be implemented with conventional laser sources and high efficiency homodyne-detectors. Here, we present our experimental results with a fully fiber-based one-way GMCS QKD system. Our system employed a double Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) configuration in which the weak quantum signal and the strong local-oscillator (LO) go through the same fiber between Alice and Bob. We employed two novel techniques to suppress system excess noise. First, to suppress the LO's leakage, an important contribution to the excess noise, we implemented a scheme combining polarization and frequency multiplexing, achieving an extinction ratio of 70dB. Second, to further minimize the system excess noise due to phase drift of the double MZI, the sender simply remaps her data by performing a rotation operation. Under a "realistic model", the secure key rates determined with a 5km and a 20km fiber link are 0.3bit/pulse and 0.05bit/pulse, respectively. These key rates are significantly higher
than that of a practical BB84 QKD system.
KEYWORDS: Sensors, Quantum key distribution, Single photon, Quantum efficiency, Signal detection, Information security, Homodyne detection, Signal attenuation, Phase measurement, Transmittance
The performance of a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system is often limited by the multi-photon state
emission of its source and the dark counts of its detectors. Here, we present two methods to improve its performance.
The first method is decoy state QKD: the sender randomly sends out weak coherent states with various average photon
numbers (which are named as signal state and decoy states). In [14,15], we have performed the first experimental
implementation of decoy state QKD over 15km and 60km respectively, thus dramatically increasing the distance and
secure key generation rate of practical QKD systems. Our work has been followed up by many research groups
worldwide [16-18]. The second scheme is QKD with "dual detectors" [19]: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a
fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement
results from the quiet detector can be used to upper bound the eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results
from the fast detector are used to generate a secure key. We applied this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation
results demonstrated significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated
coherent states protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can, in principle, provide unconditional security based on the fundamental laws of
physics. Unfortunately, a practical QKD system may contain overlooked imperfections and violate some of the
assumptions in a security proof. Here, we report two types of eavesdropping attacks against a practical QKD system. The
first one is "time-shift" attack, which is applicable to QKD systems with gated single photon detectors (SPDs). In this
attack, the eavesdropper, Eve, exploits the time mismatch between the open windows of the two SPDs. She can acquire a
significant amount of information on the final key by simply shifting the quantum signals forwards or backwards in time
domain. Our experimental results in [9] with a commercial QKD system demonstrate that, under this attack, the original
QKD system is breakable. This is the first experimental demonstration of a feasible attack against a commercial QKD
system. This is a surprising result. The second one is "phase-remapping" attack [10]. Here, Eve exploits the fact that a
practical phase modulator has a finite response time. In principle, Eve could change the encoded phase value by time-shifting
the signal pulse relative to the reference pulse.
Quantum mechanics can revolutionize the art of code-making by breaking standard encryption schemes and by making unbreakable codes. In this document, I survey the motivation, power and limitation of quantum code-making.
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